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The	political	significance	of	Poland’s	government
reshuffle
A	sweeping	reshuffle	by	Poland’s	new	prime	minister	has	changed	the	shape	and	direction	of	its
government,	with	a	greater	emphasis	being	placed	on	economic	modernisation,	political	stabilisation
and	improving	EU	relations.	But	as	Aleks	Szczerbiak	writes,	this	pivot	to	the	technocratic	centre	risks
alienating	the	ruling	party’s	core	electorate,	and	is	more	about	packaging	the	government’s	reforms
attractively	than	abandoning	its	radical	state	re-construction	programme.
Mateusz	Morawiecki,	Credit:	World	Economic	Forum	(CC	BY-NC-SA	2.0)
In	January,	Mateusz	Morawiecki	–	who,	in	a	surprise	move,	replaced	Beata	Szydło	as	Poland’s	prime	minister	–
ended	months	of	speculation	by	announcing	a	sweeping	reshuffle	of	the	Polish	government	which,	since	autumn
2015,	has	been	led	by	the	right-wing	Law	and	Justice	(PiS)	party.	The	most	symptomatic	change	involved	the
replacement	of	defence	minister	Antoni	Macierewicz,	a	powerful	figure	who	enjoys	the	backing	of	the	ruling	party’s
radical	wing,	by	interior	minister	Mariusz	Błaszczak.
Before	he	took	on	the	defence	portfolio,	Mr	Macierewicz	headed	up	a	party	commission	investigating	the	causes	of
the	2010	Smolensk	tragedy	in	which	the	then	Law	and	Justice-backed	President	Lech	Kaczyński,	twin	brother	of
party	leader	Jarosław	Kaczyński,	and	dozens	of	other	senior	officials	died	in	a	plane	crash	in	Western	Russia.	The
Smolensk	issue	was	a	touchstone	for	the	party’s	core	supporters	and	viewed	as	part	of	a	broader	pattern	of	betrayal
of	the	country’s	interests	by	the	liberal-centrist	Civic	Platform	(PO),	Poland’s	ruling	party	between	2007	and	2015	and
currently	the	main	opposition	grouping.
However,	Mr	Macierewicz’s	commission	caused	controversy	by	appearing	to	countenance	sabotage	as	a	possible
cause,	but	failed	to	find	conclusive	evidence	of	this	even	when	it	became	an	official	state	body	after	Law	and
Justice’s	2015	election	victory.	As	defence	minister,	he	also	clashed	repeatedly	with	Law	and	Justice-backed
President	Andrzej	Duda	who,	according	to	the	Polish	Constitution,	is	commander-in-chief	of	the	armed	forces.
Moreover,	Jarosław	Kaczyński	–	who	does	not	hold	any	formal	state	positions	but	exercises	a	powerful	behind-the-
scenes	influence	in	determining	the	government’s	programmatic	and	strategic	priorities,	and	is	always	sensitive	to
potential	challengers	–	became	concerned	that	Mr	Macierewicz	was	using	the	ministry	to	develop	an	independent
political	power	base.	Some	commentators	also	suggested	that	pressure	from	the	US	State	Department	played	a
decisive	role	in	Mr	Macierewicz’s	sacking.
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Other	high	profile	dismissals	included	foreign	minister	Witold	Waszczykowski,	who	was	often	embroiled	in	disputes
with	the	EU	political	establishment	and	replaced	by	his	less	controversial	deputy	Jacek	Czaputowicz.	Council	of
Ministers	standing	committee	chairman	Henryk	Kowalczyk	replaced	environment	minister	Jan	Szyszko,	who	had
attracted	widespread	criticism	over	his	moves	to	allow	logging	in	the	Białowieża	primeval	forest.	Cardiologist	and
deputy	higher	education	minister	Łukasz	Szumowski	took	over	as	health	minister	from	Konstanty	Radziwiłł,	who
failed	to	resolve	a	high	profile	dispute	involving	resident	doctors.
At	the	same	time,	Mr	Morawiecki	appointed	his	former	deputies	to	lead	the	key	ministries	that	he	had	headed	up
before	becoming	prime	minister:	Teresa	Czerwińska	as	finance	minister,	Jerzy	Kwieciński	as	investment	and
development	minister,	and	Jadwiga	Emilewicz	in	the	entrepreneurship	and	technology	brief.	All	of	these	were
centrist,	technocratic	figures	not	associated	with	front	line	party	politics;	although	Mr	Morawiecki	also	re-appointed
justice	minister	Zbigniew	Ziobro,	who	oversaw	the	government’s	controversial	judicial	reforms.
Strengthening	the	prime	minister	and	President
Mr	Morawiecki	only	became	a	Law	and	Justice	member	in	March	2016	and	lacked	a	power	base	in	the	ruling	party’s
factional	politics,	raising	doubts	as	to	whether	he	would	be	able	to	resolve	the	government’s	main	structural
weakness:	infighting	between	ministers	entrenched	in	their	departmental	power	bases.	However,	the	fact	he
appeared	to	be	given	a	free-hand	to	stamp	his	authority	on	the	government	and	dismiss	such	powerful	figures	as	Mr
Macierewicz	suggests	that	the	new	prime	minister	has	much	greater	room	for	manoeuvre	then	his	predecessor.
Mr	Morawiecki	clearly	enjoys	Mr	Kaczyński’s	trust	and	there	is	even	speculation	that	the	Law	and	Justice	leader	is
grooming	him	as	his	long-term	successor.	Nonetheless,	Mr	Kaczyński	remains	a	key	figure	in	settling	personnel	and
policy	disagreements	within	the	governing	camp	and	ensured	that	two	of	his	most	trusted	allies,	Mr	Błaszczak	and
party	organisation	supremo	Joachim	Brudziński,	were	appointed	to	head	up	the	key	defence	and	interior	ministries.
Another	important	consequence	of	the	reshuffle,	especially	Mr	Macierewicz‘s	dismissal,	was	to	strengthen	Mr	Duda’s
position	and	defuse	the	row	between	the	President	and	the	ruling	party	which,	at	one	time,	appeared	to	threaten	the
unity	of	the	governing	camp.	Relations	between	Mr	Duda	and	the	Law	and	Justice	leadership	became	very	tense
after	the	President’s	dramatic	and	surprising	decision	last	July	to	veto	two	of	the	government’s	flagship	judicial	reform
laws,	as	part	of	an	effort	to	assert	his	independence	and	autonomy.
However,	rather	than	embarking	upon	a	confrontational	course,	Mr	Kaczyński	decided	to	try	and	mend	relations	with
the	President	and	conceded	a	certain	amount	of	influence	to	him	over	policy	and	appointments.	Improving	relations
with	Mr	Duda	would	have	been	impossible	beyond	a	certain	point	if	Mr	Macierewicz	had	remained	in	office	and	Mr
Kaczyński	was	clearly	willing	to	risk	alienating	certain	elements	of	Law	and	Justice’s	political	base	in	order	to
strengthen	the	governing	camp’s	internal	cohesion.
Political	stabilisation	and	improving	EU	relations
One	of	the	reshuffle’s	main	objectives	was	to	stabilise	and	consolidate	Law	and	Justice’s	position	ahead	of	a	series
of	key	elections:	local	government	elections	in	autumn	2018,	European	Parliament	elections	in	summer	2019,	and
parliamentary	elections	in	autumn	2019,	culminating	in	the	summer	2020	presidential	poll.	Since	it	was	elected	in
2015,	the	government	has	undertaken	a	series	of	controversial	reforms,	notably	of	the	judiciary,	civil	service	and
public	broadcasting.	These	have	laid	the	groundwork	for	a	radical	reconstruction	of	the	Polish	state	but	also
precipitated	large-scale	anti-government	protests	and	led	to	opposition	accusations	of	creeping	authoritarianism
(which	the	government	vigorously	denies),	as	well	as	bringing	the	ruling	party	into	conflict	with	the	country’s	legal
establishment	and	cultural	elites.
Beata	Szydło’s	administration	took	the	political	flak	for	introducing	these	reforms	but,	with	the	passage	of	the	judicial
reform	laws	at	the	end	of	last	year,	many	of	the	key	elements	of	the	government’s	state	re-construction	programme
are	now	in	place.	Mr	Morawiecki	is,	therefore,	hoping	to	shift	the	focus	of	debate	in	the	second	half	of	the
government’s	parliamentary	term	away	from	these	controversial	issues	by	portraying	his	administration	as	a	team	of
technocratic	experts	governing	efficiently,	modernising	an	increasingly	prosperous	and	secure	country,	and	ensuring
that	ordinary	Poles	share	in	the	benefits	of	economic	growth.
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The	reshuffle	is	thus	an	attempt	to	broaden	Law	and	Justice’s	appeal	to	more	centrist,	less	politically	committed
Poles	who	do	not	reject	the	ruling	party	outright	but	mistrust	figures	such	as	Mr	Macierewicz;	as	well	as	encouraging
the	country’s	elites	to	come	to	terms	with	the	government.	Indeed,	some	commentators	have	suggested	that	the
reshuffle	may	be	part	of	a	more	ambitious,	long-term	project	of	transforming	Law	and	Justice	into	a	pragmatic
conservative	grouping;	although	others	dismiss	it	as	simply	a	tactical	pivot	similar	to	the	one	that	the	party	performed
so	successfully	in	the	run-up	to	the	2015	elections.
Part	of	the	motivation	for	the	reshuffle	was	also	to	improve	relations	with	the	EU	political	establishment.	Law	and
Justice	has	found	itself	in	conflict	with	the	EU	institutions	and	major	European	powers	on	several	fronts.	It	refuses	to
implement	an	EU	plan	for	the	compulsory	relocation	of	Middle	Eastern	and	North	African	migrants,	which	it	argues
would	force	multi-culturalism	upon	Poland	and	threaten	its	national	security.	It	disputed	a	European	Court	of	Justice
order	to	stop	logging	in	the	Białowieża	Forest,	arguing	that	it	was	only	removing	trees	on	public	safety	grounds.
In	December,	Poland	also	became	the	first	EU	state	to	have	a	so-called	Article	7	procedure	launched	against	it
following	criticisms	from	the	European	Commission	that	a	dispute	over	appointments	to	and	the	functioning	of	the
country’s	constitutional	tribunal,	and	the	government’s	judicial	reform	programme,	posed	a	threat	to	the	rule	of	law;	a
charge	that	Law	and	Justice	vigorously	denies.	For	many	commentators,	Mr	Waszczykowski	and	Mr	Szyszko
symbolised	the	government’s	poor	relations	with	the	Commission	and	their	dismissal	was	prompted	by	a	desire	to
give	the	government	a	more	EU-friendly	image.
Pivoting	to	the	centre	carries	risks
Opinion	polls	suggest	that	the	reshuffle	has	proved	very	popular	and	Mr	Morawiecki	is	enjoying	a	political
honeymoon.	A	January	survey	by	the	CBOS	polling	agency	found	that	61%	of	respondents	evaluated	the	reshuffle
positively	compared	with	only	9%	who	viewed	it	negatively	(30%	were	undecided),	and	54%	were	pleased	that	Mr
Morawiecki	had	taken	over	as	prime	minister	while	only	20%	were	dissatisfied	(26%	undecided).	The	‘Pooling	the
Poles’	micro-blog	that	aggregates	voting	intention	surveys	shows	Law	and	Justice	averaging	48%	support	(in	the
autumn	2015	election	it	secured	37.6%)	compared	with	only	24%	for	Civic	Platform,	and	other	opposition	parties	on
single	figures.
However,	Law	and	Justice’s	change	of	strategy	also	carries	risks.	While	the	government	has	enjoyed	the	fruits	of
strong	growth	and	low	unemployment,	it	also	needs	to	deliver	on	its	ambitious	investment	and	modernisation
agenda,	while	an	economic	downturn	would	make	it	difficult	to	finance	the	very	costly	social	spending	programmes
that	have	been	crucial	to	its	continued	popularity.	It	may	also	prove	impossible	to	avoid	divisive	political	conflicts.	For
example,	the	Polish	parliament	is	currently	debating	a	civic	initiative	to	further	tighten	the	abortion	law.	Most	Law	and
Justice	deputies	support	this,	but	in	autumn	2016	large	protests	forced	the	ruling	party	to	vote	down	a	previous
attempt	to	introduce	greater	restrictions.
Moreover,	while	Mr	Morawiecki	indicated	that	Warsaw	is	open	to	negotiations	with	the	Commission,	he	has	also
made	it	clear	that	his	government	will	not	abandon,	or	even	significantly	modify,	its	judicial	reforms,	nor	its	opposition
to	compulsory	migrant	relocation.	Two	important	tests	for	the	Morawiecki	administration	will	be:	whether	Poland	can
find	six	countries	prepared	to	block	the	Article	7	procedure	at	the	first	stage	of	voting	in	the	Council	of	Ministers
(probably	at	the	end	of	February);	and	if	the	new	EU	budget,	negotiations	on	which	begin	later	this	year,	will	link
disbursal	of	funds	to	the	functioning	of	a	member	state’s	judiciary.
More	broadly,	there	is	a	risk	that	Law	and	Justice’s	pivot	to	the	centre	could	alienate	a	section	of	its	core	electorate
and	supporting	media,	notably	the	milieu	clustered	around	the	Catholic	‘Radio	Maryja’	broadcaster	which	is	very
influential	among	Poland’s	‘religious	right’.	Many	of	the	party	grassroots	were	already	disorientated	by	the	fact	that
the	popular	and	folksy	Szydło	was	replaced	by	Morawiecki,	a	technocratic	former	bank	chief	executive.	However,
with	its	support	at	record	levels,	Law	and	Justice	is	counting	on	the	fact	that	Macierewicz	and	the	Radio	Maryja
milieu	will	reject	the	idea	of	a	right-wing	breakaway	party	as	politically	suicidal.	Moreover,	even	if	they	do	not	always
understand	the	rationale	underpinning	his	political	manoeuvres,	the	great	bulk	of	the	party’s	core	supporters	still	trust
Mr	Kaczyński’s	instincts	and	see	his	continued	leadership	of	the	governing	camp	as	the	best	guarantee	of	its	right-
wing	bona	fides.
Softening	the	government’s	image,	but	not	changing	policy
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Mr	Morawiecki’s	radical	reshuffle	has	significantly	changed	the	shape	and	direction	of	the	Law	and	Justice
government,	with	a	much	greater	emphasis	on	economic	modernisation	and	political	stabilisation	both	domestically
and	internationally.	The	party’s	apparent	pivot	to	the	moderate	technocratic	centre	has	also	made	it	more	difficult	for
the	weak	and	divided	opposition	to	develop	an	effective	strategic	response	and	sustain	its	narrative	that	a	divisive
and	illiberal	government	is	isolating	Poland.
At	the	same	time,	while	Mr	Morawiecki	clearly	has	a	different	governing	style	from	his	predecessor,	the	new
administration	appears	just	as	committed	to	pursuing	the	core	elements	of	Law	and	Justice’s	programme	of	so-called
‘good	change’	(dobra	zmiana).	The	adjustment	has	so	far	been	more	about	softening	the	government’s	image	and
presenting	its	reforms	more	attractively	rather	than	any	substantive	policy	change.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	Aleks	Szczerbiak’s	personal	blog.	The	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,
not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
_________________________________
About	the	author
Aleks	Szczerbiak	–	University	of	Sussex
Aleks	Szczerbiak	is	Professor	of	Politics	and	Contemporary	European	Studies	at	the	University	of
Sussex.	He	is	author	of	Poland	Within	the	European	Union?	New	Awkward	Partner	or	New	Heart	of
Europe?(Routledge,	2012)	and	blogs	regularly	about	developments	on	the	Polish	political	scene
at	http://polishpoliticsblog.wordpress.com/
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The political significance of Poland’s government reshuffle Page 4 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-02-01
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/02/01/the-political-significance-of-polands-government-reshuffle/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
